ABSTRACT Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software Defined Networking (SDN) [1] is a new networking paradigm, which facilitates network management and enables programmatically efficient network configuration in order to improve the network performance. SDN decouples the data forwarding plane and the control plane. A SDN switch becomes simpler and lighter, since it does not need to support complex logic of distributed routing protocols.
OpenFlow [2] is an implementation of SDN standardizes the interface between the control plane and the data plane. In the OpenFlow paradigm, a controller is logically connected with all the switches while each of the switch possesses one or several flow tables. The controller can control the flow tables of per switch by installing, modifying and deleting the rules in the switch remotely. The switches only need to perform forwarding process according to the indication of rules in their flow tables.
However, the centralization of control logic and the programmability of SDN introduces new threats. Seven main potential threat vectors especially in SDN are shown in [3] , including 1) forged or faked traffic flows, 2) attacks on vulnerabilities in switches, 3) attacks on control plane communications, 4) attacks on and vulnerabilities in controllers, 5) lack of mechanisms to ensure trust between the controller and management applications, 6) attacks on and vulnerabilities in administrative stations, and 7) lack of trusted resources for forensics and remediation.
Among them, the single point failure of central controller is the most serious threat that will affect the performance of the entire network. The attack aims at overwhelming the controller or the south band interface between controller and switches. Additionally, the reactive flow table entries installing mechanism of OpenFlow makes controller more vulnerable. Once there is no matching flow table rule for the incoming packet, the switch will cache the packet in the buffer and send a Packet_In message to the controller including a maximum of 128 bytes of the received packet header as well as the buffer id. The controller will parse the packet header and install the flow table rules back to the switch with Flow_Mod and Packet_Out messages.
Furthermore, if the buffer of the certain switch is full, the switch will send the Packet_In message with entire packet to the controller according to OpenFlow specification [4] . In this case, the controller needs to respond to the switch with an Packet_Out message, which includes the entire data packet. Attackers may make use of this mechanism to launch a DoS/DDoS flooding attack to exhaust the control plane bandwidth or processing resource of the controller by sending a large amount of mismatched packets to the switches. What is worse, an attacker can send data-plane packets with low sending rate to disguise as a benign host. The attackers prefer to use low traffic rate to trigger the attack so that it is difficult to detect the malicious flows in the data plane [18] . Although the data-plane traffic from the attackers is low in rate, this attack can still lead to heavy consumption on the control plane resource [5] . The new flow table entries cannot be installed on the switches in time so that all the switches controlled by this controller may be unable to serve new arriving flows. As a result, the performance of the entire network will decrease dramatically.
In this paper, we focus on this flooding attack which aims at overwhelming the controller or the south band interface. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis based approach to protect the SDN controller from this kind of attack. We develop a protection component as an application in the SDN controller. In the application, we build a popularity table to record the popularity of the required destination addresses periodically. Furthermore, we take several factors into consideration to determine the threshold. When the load of controller is higher than the threshold, the controller will be considered under attack. Then, the defense mode will be activated. The buffer queue of the switch will turn into dual queues mode with different priority. Some proactive flow table rules of the most popular addresses will be installed by the controller according to the popularity table. The proactive flow table rules will ensure that the most popular addresses can be accessed with higher priority. The other packets will be mitigated to another queue with low priority, which will be sent to the controller with rate limiting when the high priority queue is empty. In addition, a timeout analysis module is developed to distinguish the malicious hosts from the benign hosts by analyzing the timeout information of Flow_Removed messages. The packets from the malicious hosts will be dropped by the switch according to the blocking rules.
The contributions of this paper are: (1) We propose a cooperation mechanism of multiple flow tables to implement the functions of blacklist, proactive rules and dual buffer queues.
(2) We develop a popularity calculating module which maintains a popularity table. Furthermore, we propose a Popularity Calculation algorithm to periodically calculate the popularity value of each destination address. When the attack happens, the most popular addresses will be added to the switches proactively.
(3) We develop a timeout analysis module to analyze the lifetime of each flow. Moreover, we propose a Malicious Host Discrimination algorithm to distinguish the malicious hosts from the benign hosts and block them.
(4) We develop the prototype system of our popularity and timeout analysis based SDN controller protection approach in real SDN environment.
(5) We simulate experiments to verify the functions and evaluate the performance of our controller protection approach. PoTiA can alleviate the controller from flooding attack effectively. The simulation result shows that the detection rate is 99.90% and the false alarm rate is 0.41%.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II mainly introduces the related works and compares our work with them; Section III introduces the threat model and the countermeasures to the threat; Section IV mainly introduces the system design of PoTiA; In Section V, we simulate sufficient experiments to verify the functions and evaluate the performance of PoTiA; In Section VI, we make a conclusion of our work and lay out the further work.
II. RELATED WORK
The security and dependability of SDN has become a hot research field for researchers. There are two main directions in the area of SDN security. One is taking advantage of SDN technique to solve the traditional security challenges. Another is studying the security of SDN itself which aims to protect the SDN-enabled infrastructure.
Concerning the first aspect, as SDN provides a global view of the network, some method about traffic analysis can run on the SDN controller to detect anomaly in the network. Reference [6] proposes to treat DPI as a service in SDN network which has significant advantages in performance, scalability and robustness. Reference [7] utilizes SDN to overcome the difficulty and effectively block legitimate looking DDoS attacks mounted by a larger number of bots. Reference [8] proposes an event-based SDN architecture which performs protocol analysis to extract policy neutral events from network traffic. ATLANTIC [9] proposes a framework to for anomaly traffic detection, classification, and mitigation in SDN. ATLANTIC combines the use of information theory to calculate deviations in the entropy of flow tables and a range of machine learning algorithms to classify traffic flows. SD-Anti-DDoS [10] proposes a fast and efficient DDoS defense mechanism in SDN, which consists of four modules, namely attack detection trigger, attack detection, attack trace back and attack mitigation. SD-Anti-DDoS can block the attack in source and release the occupied resources of switches. FL-GUARD [37] is proposed to tackle with DDoS attack with Floodlight controller. The system can realize anti-spoofing of source IP address and make a variety of amplification attacks lose their effect. Then, support vector machine algorithm is used to detect attacks and a flow table can be issued to block attacks at the source port.
Another aspect is about enhancing the security of SDN-enabled architecture, which is concentrated by us in this paper. Many researchers are working on solving this issue. Reference [11] proposes an inference attack model for flow table capacity to exploit the vulnerability of flow table overflow attack in Software-Defined Network. The framework can infer the network parameters, such as flow table capacity and flow table usage, with an accuracy of 80% or higher. Avant-Guard [12] is proposed to solve the control plane saturation attack. Avant-Guard modifies the switch and introduces a module in the controller, which implements a SYN proxy to handle TCP handshake. It can effectively defend TCP based saturation attack against control plane. FloodGuard [13] proposes a proactive flow rule analyzing module and packet mitigation module to protect the controller from being overloaded. The idea of proactive flow table rules is used by us in this paper for reference. However, as the storage limitation of the flow table in a SDN switch, not all the rules should be installed on the switch proactively. In our design, we just proactively install rules for the most popular addresses. FlowRanger [14] is proposed to alleviate the pressure of controller when it is suffering flooding attack. Each time slot, FlowRanger can calculate the priority for each host's address and serve the hosts with higher priority. However, the accuracy of FlowRanger is not good enough as it only takes the sending rate of hosts into consideration. And in every time slot, some benign requests are misjudged as the malicious ones even when there is no attack. LineSwitch [15] proposes an efficient and effective data plane solution to tackle the control plane saturation attack. LineSwitch employs probabilistic proxy and blacklist for network traffic to prevent the attack against the control plane. Reference [16] proposes a Packet-In message filtering mechanism to filter out Packet-In messages for protection of control plane in OpenFlow networks. The mechanism make switches to record the values of packet header fields before sending Packet-In messages and filter out packets that have the same values as the recorded ones. However, this approach requires the switches to be more intelligence, which violates the design principles of SDN. We make use of the native multiple flow tables mechanism of OpenFlow to implement attack defending. Reference [17] proposes a smart security mechanism to defend against the new-flow attack in SDN-enabled IoT environment. The monitoring method reuses the standard Asynchronous Messages and controls the invocation of Controller-to-Switch Messages to achieve the low monitoring cost. Reference [18] proves that the malicious low-traffic flows can lead to significant resources consumption in the control plane. It proposes a detection method for this kind DoS attack to the controller by monitoring the low-traffic flows. However, no effective mitigation strategy is introduced in [18] . Reference [19] proposes a controller sandboxing mechanism, PAFR, which enables controller/host isolation, plug-and-play operation, failure-and-attack-resilient execution, and fast recovery. It prevents the controller from direct attack from the malicious hosts. However, the threat of network layer saturation are not well considered. SDNShield [20] is a combined solution towards defense against DDoS attacks on SDN control plane. It implements a software boxes to improve the scalability of ingress SDN switches in order to accommodate control plane workload surges and further incorporates a two stages filtering scheme to protect the centralized controller. SDN-Guard [21] is proposed as a SDN network protection approach comprehensively against DoS attacks on the controller performance, switch memory usage and control plane bandwidth by rerouting potential malicious traffic, adjusting flow timeouts and aggregating flow rules. However, SDN-Guard cannot identify the attacker and prevent the malicious flows effectively. Reference [34] proposes a SDN controller protecting approach with per-flow buffering inside OpenFlow switches. It utilizes the buffer_id feature of the OpenFlow protocol to identify flows buffered as a series of packets during tablemiss. However, this approach requires a large storage capacity of OpenFlow switches, which is typically limited. Controller DAC [35] is proposed to address the app-to-control threats in SDN. SDN Controller DAC is a controller-independent dynamic access control system which can protect SDN controller against API abuse. FADM [36] is proposed to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks in SDN. FADM can collect the network traffic information through SDN controller and sFlow agent. Then, an entropy based method is used to measure network features and the SVM classifier is applied to identify network anomalies. FADM further implements a white-list and traffic mitigation mechanism to protect the network. Solid-Flow [38] is proposed as a module to enhance flow rules database integrity within the SDN controller. SolidFlow periodically checks the fresh hash of the flow rules with the previous ones to ensure consistency.
In our approach, we comprehensively take the arriving rate to the controller, the popularity of hosts and the duration of flows into consideration to detect and prevent the attack rapidly with higher accuracy.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. THREAT MODEL
As stated earlier, the reactive flow table entries installing mechanism makes SDN controller vulnerable to the Packet_In flooding attack. In a SDN network, when a switch receives a packet which has no matching flow table entries indicating how to process the packet, the switch will send the packet header to the controller through a Packet_In message for further processing. Once the controller receives the Packet_In message from the switches, it will calculate the routing path for the certain flow and send the Flow_Mod and Packet_Out messages back to the corresponding switches. The requests are commonly queued in the controller's buffer waiting for the controller to process by first-come-first-serve VOLUME 6, 2018 manner. The flooding attack may fill up the buffer quickly so that the following request messages will be dropped.
As shown in Figure 1 , the malicious hosts can generate a large amount of packets with different new destination addresses, aiming to launch a Packet_In flooding attack. The flooding attack aims at exhausting the network resources in the control plane of the SDN architecture. The controller can easily be overwhelmed because of the limited processing capability. The crash of the controller will lead to the Denial of Service for the benign hosts, too. However, we cannot simply identify an attacker according to its data-plane sending rate. The attackers can disguise themselves with low data-plane sending rate as the benign hosts [18] . Instead, the sending rate of a benign host may be fast in some cases. Likewise, we cannot identify an attack according to the volume of traffic in the data plane. As no matter how heavy the traffic of a new flow is, only the first few packets of this flow will be encapsulated in the Packet-In messages and be sent to the controller. The impact to the controller in this case is negligible. Thus, the attackers will prefer to use low data-plane sending rate to disguise themselves. In addition, to initiate an effective flooding attack, there should be a certain number of malicious hosts. Each of the malicious hosts should request multiple different destination addresses. As a result, the number of Packet_In requests to the controller will increase significantly. However, we should not simply treat a host which has accessed multiple destination addresses as a malicious host, either. Otherwise, some normal behavior, such as P2P, may be misjudged as an attack.
Assuming that the requests sending rate from hosts to switch is λ. The matching probability for each packet is θ 0 < θ < 1. We have analyzed the normal traffic trace mentioned in [17] , which is collected from the real campus boundary routers. We have found that every one second the number of packets belong to a new flow only occupies 15%-25% of total data-plane packets. Generally, a benign host will not continually request for new destination addresses so that θ should be a larger number approaching 1. On the contrary, θ of a malicious host should be very small, which approaches 0. Only the mismatched packets will be sent to the controller so that the rate of the requests sending from the switch to the controller will be (1 − θ)λ. Normally, the arriving rate should be much smaller than the service rate of controller. However, when the attack happens, θ will decrease considerably. The arriving rate (1 − θ)λ will be greater than the service rate of controller, which will lead to a controller oriented flooding attack. Additionally, benign requests will not be served in time, which will further lead to host oriented DoS attack.
B. COUNTERMEASURES TO THE THREAT
In OpenFlow specification 1.3 [4] , meter table is introduced into the switches to limit the request rate of the switch port as shown in Figure 2 . A meter table consists of meter entries, defining per-flow meters. Per-flow meters enable OpenFlow to implement various simple QoS operations, such as ratelimiting. Each meter entry is identified by its meter identifier and contains meter identifier, meter band and counters. In the meter band, the Band Type determine the packet management when the arriving rate exceeds the threshold. This mechanism can protect the controller and the switches at some degree. However, it does not relieve the impact of the flooding attack since it cannot distinguish whether the flow is benign or malicious and it limits their speed in the same way.
To defend against this kind of attack, we should primarily find the difference between the benign hosts and the malicious hosts. It is important to notice that, the connection between a malicious host and the destination address is unidirectional and discontinuous generally. Because the attackers just send out many packets with different destination addresses without caring about any response. However, a benign host usually interacts with the existed destination addresses so that the sessions usually last for a while.
In the OpenFlow specification, Flow_Removed message is an optional message determined by the Flow_Mod message, which belongs to Asynchronous Messages. When the controller is installing a Flow_Mod message, it can determine whether the flag of Flow_Removed is enabled. If the Flow_Removed flag is enabled, the switch will send a Flow_Removed message to the controller when the flow is removed from the flow table. In our design, we can distinguish the malicious hosts from the benign hosts by analyzing each flow's lifetime and further calculate the trust value of each host.
It needs a period of time to discriminate all the attackers and block them according to our algorithms, which will be discussed in Section V-E. However, we want to relieve the impact of the flooding attack as quickly as possible. As proved in [22] that Zipf's law governs many features of the Internet. A few sites consist of millions of pages, while millions of sites only contain a handful of pages. A few sites contain millions of links, while many sites have one or two. Millions of users flock to a few select sites, giving little attention to millions of others. Moreover, [33] indicates that 94.87% of the entire visiting traffic is devoted to 15.08% of all visited websites, whereas 84.63% of engagements are on the top 6.16% visited websites. Inspired by Zipf's law, we attempt to calculate the popularity for each destination address and install flow table rules for those most popular addresses proactively once the attack happens. In this way, part of the legal traffic can survive from the attack.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
To minimize the impact of controller flooding attack, we propose a controller protection system and develop a popularity-based proactive flow table entries installing and timeout analyzing based controller protection approach, which can protect the network when the controller is suffering a Packet_In flooding attack.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE CONTROLLER PROTECTION SYSTEM
The entire architecture of our system is shown in Figure 3 . In our design, we build the prototype with Ryu as the SDN controller and OpenvSwitch as the SDN switch. A popularity and timeout analysis based controller protection application is designed and developed on the SDN controller, which includes the Condition Monitor module, the Accessed Host Recording module, the Popularity Calculating module and the Timeout Analysis module. A Queue Management module is developed in the controller to manage the messages received from the switches. On the switch side, we take advantage of OpenFlow 1.3's multiple flow tables mechanism to implement the cooperation mechanism of three flow tables in the SDN switch while each of the flow table is responsible for its own function. Additionally, a mechanism of dual priority buffer queues is designed to differentiate popular addresses from the others. We have modified OpenvSwitch to support the dual priority buffer queues. The unpopular and malicious requests will be sent to the controller with rate limiting. The detail of the system will be introduced in the following parts. When the Controller Protection System is initialed, the system will turn into idle state and the popularity calculating module will keep calculating the popularity of the hosts and updating the popularity table. Once the attack is detected, the system will turn into the defense state. The controller will be protected and the attack traffic will be mitigated. Once the system detects that the attack has ended, the system will turn back to the idle state. The popularity calculating module will continue to work. The flowchart of entire system is shown in Figure 4 .
B. COOPERATION MECHANISM OF MULTIPLE FLOW TABLES
In our approach, we make full use of the multiple flow tables' mechanism of OpenFlow protocol to relieve the influence of Packet_In flooding attack on the controller. The specification of OpenFlow 1.1 protocol introduces a more flexible pipeline with multiple tables. The following specifications of OpenFlow protocol have inherited this mechanism, including OpenFlow 1.3 protocol. Exposing multiple tables has many advantages. One of the advantages is that many network deployments combine orthogonal processing of packets. Packets are processed through the pipeline, they are matched and processed in the first table, and may be matched and processed in other tables. The action set is resolved at the end of the pipeline and applied to the packet.
There are three flow tables in our designed switch, which are Blacklist Table (Table 1) , Reactive Flow Table (Table 2) and Popular Address Matching Table (Table 3) , respectively. The flow table rules of Table 1 and Table 3 difference with the ones in a common OpenFlow switch. If the incoming packet matches a rule in this table, it will be forwarded to the corresponding switch port as the rule indicates. Otherwise, the packet will be sent to Table 3 for further matching.
Popular Address Matching Table stores the addresses matching rules of the most popular addresses, which are installed by the controller according to the popularity table proactively. This table is used to distinguish whether the requested destination address is popular. The rules in this table are the coarse ones, which are designed to only match the destination address. If the destination address of the incoming packet is matched in this table, this packet will be encapsulated in a Packet_In message and forwarded to the controller through the high priority queue Q H . Otherwise, if there are still no matching rules, the packet will be mitigated to the low priority queue Q L waiting for Packet_In sending to the controller with rate limiting. To implement this function, we have modified the OpenvSwitch to make it support dual buffer queues with different priority levels. The switch can keep interacting with the Queue Management Module in the controller and can keep sending Packet_In messages with different priority to it. The details about the Queue Management Module will be introduced in Section IV-C-5. After the Packet_In requests have been parsed, the controller will install specific flow table rules for the requests and send them to the Reactive Flow Table on the switches. The following packets belong to this flow will be forwarded to the destination directly.
The relation among the three flow tables is shown in Figure 5 . In the common case, only Table 2 is at work and the mismatch action of Table 2 is to send Packet_In messages to the controller. The controller protection application keeps running to calculate the popularity of each host and monitor the condition of the controller. When the attack is detected, all the three tables will start to work.
C. POPULARITY AND TIMEOUT ANALYSIS BASED CONTROLLER PROTECTION APPLICATION
In this part, we will mainly introduce the design of the popularity and timeout analysis based controller protection application running on the SDN controller. There are four key modules in the controller protection application, which are The first three modules will keep running since the system initiates. When the System Condition Monitor detects that the controller is likely to be suffering an attack, the Timeout Analysis Module will start to work.
1) CONDITION MONITORING MODULE
Condition monitoring module is used to monitor whether the controller is under attack. This module works in main thread and maintains a state machine to determine the operating state of the system, which is shown in Figure 6 .
There are mainly four states in the system, which is the Idle state, the Attack Defense state, the Initial state and the Finish state. During the Idle state, the module keeps monitoring the rate of incoming messages from each switches. If the arriving rate exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the System Condition Monitor module will judge that the controller is suffering an attack and turn into the Initial state. At the beginning of the Initial state, the system will enable all the three Flow Tables and dual priority queues in the switch. Then, the system will acquire the information of most popular addresses from Popularity Calculating Module and further get the binding information of these addresses from Access Host Recording Module to generate proactive flow table rules and install them in the Popularity Address Matching 
2) ACCESSED HOST RECORDING MODULE
We create an accessed host table in the accessed host recording module, which maintains the binding information of the accessed host and the switch it attaches. When the controller receives the Packet_In message from the switch, it will record the information of each host and restore it in the accessed host table. Each entry in the table is stored as the format of {(dpid, port): (ip_addr, mac)}. dpid is the switch identifier and port is the interface of the switch, which the host accesses to. ip_addr and mac represent the IP address and the MAC address of the accessed host respectively. Several different types of SDN controller have the familiar function. Such as the arp_table of l3_learning.py module in POX [23] controller. The accessed host table has several of advantages. Firstly, the binding information of hosts and switches can help the controller to process Packet_In messages faster. The controller does not need to send flooding ARP requests to all the switches every time. Moreover, the binding information can help the controller to detect IP address spoofing. If a Packet_In message carries the same source IP address that has already in the accessed host table but different binding switch, the controller can implement some mechanism to judge whether the IP is spoof. In our design, if this happens, the controller will send an ARP request via the old binding switch port to this IP address. If there is no reply, we consider that the host has moved to a new place. The accessed host recording module will delete the old binding entry and add a new one. Otherwise, if there is a reply from the host, we will consider this IP address being spoofed by a malicious host.
3) POPULARITY CALCULATING MODULE
In popularity calculating module, a popularity table is created to record the popularity of each accessed host, including the benign users, the attackers and the servers. In this paper, we principally take the popularity of the servers as the research object. We define the popularity of a host according to its frequency of being accessed to. The popularity value of each host is updated periodically. We treat the IP address as the host's identifier. Therefore, we are mainly concerned about the destination IP address as the target of popularity calculation. We propose a popularity management algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1. All the parameters used in this paper is presented in Table 1 . Among the parameters, d r , i r and h r represent duration, idle timeout and hard timeout of the flow respectively, which are defined in OpenFlow protocol specification [4] . The value of some parameters are set according to the attack model or experimental setting which will be explained later.
Every new time slot, when the controller receives a Packet_In message or a Flow_Removed message belong to flow r, if the destination IP address dIP r not in the popularity table, it will be added to the table with the default initial popularity value as PV default . A counter C i (t) is proposed to record the frequency of IP address i in time slot t. Additionally, the duration of the flow belong to an IP address should be taken into account as some flows belong to a popular address may last for a relative long time. In our algorithm, the ratio of the duration d r or hard timeout h r to the length of a time slot T will be added up to the counter.
At the end of each time slot t, if the counter C i (t) exceeds the threshold N th (t), the PV of IP i will increase by 1. If N th (t) > C i (t) > 0, the PV of IP i will remain unchanged. Otherwise, the PV of IP i will be multiplied by a forgetting factor α, where 0 < α < 1. The value of α can be set according to the variation of network state. In this paper, when there is no attack, the network state is relatively stable in the experiment. The value of α will have little influence on the experimental results. The detail of the value of α will be discussed in the experiment.
It should be noted that, N th (t) is the threshold counter of the destination IP address in a time slot, which is associated with the sum of C i (t) > 0. We calculate N th (t) as equation 1 according to Zipf's Law, where n is the total number of IP addresses in the popularity table.
For example, 100 IP addresses have appeared in time slot t so that n equals to 100. Amount of each IP address' frequency in time slot t can be calculated by n i=1 C i (t), which is 1000. Threshold can be calculated through formula 1, where
At last, if the PV of any IP address in the table is lower than the popularity threshold PV default , this IP address will be deleted from the popularity table. In our design, the value of PV default is set as 1.0.
4) TIMEOUT ANALYSIS MODULE
The timeout analysis module is developed to analyze the lifetime of the flows. The information of a flow's lifetime can be get from the field of the Flow_Removed message. The module can distinguish the malicious hosts from the benign ones by analyzing the lifetime of each flow. Once the malicious host is identified, the blocking entries will be added to the Blacklist Table, which has the highest priority. The following attack traffic will be dropped from the source. In the timeout analysis module, we maintain a trust value table for every hosts. We propose a malicious host discrimination algorithm to keep calculating trust values of each host and distinguishing the malicious hosts from the benign ones, which is shown in Algorithm 2.
Commonly, a normal communication between two hosts is usually continuous and bidirectional. Moreover, the conversation usually lasts for a period. On the contrary, the malicious host needs to send packets to different destination IP address to make the attack more effective. It is usually careless about whether there is any response from the destination. Therefore, the communication from the malicious host is usually discontinuous and directional so that the flow table entries of the malicious hosts will usually be removed after the idle timeout is reached. In timeout analysis module, we set a default timeout threshold T θ and a packet count threshold P θ . If the duration of a flow is lower than T θ and meanwhile the packet count of the flow is lower than P θ , we will treat this flow as suspicious flow. On the contrary, the flow will be treat as a legal flow if the duration of this flow is longer than T θ and meanwhile the packet count of the flow is higher than P θ . In our design, P θ is set as 3, which will be discussed in the experiment. When the attack happens, any request to an unknown destination will be treat as a suspicious request. The suspicious counter of the certain source IP address will increase correspondingly.
Every time slot t, timeout analysis module calculates the trust value of each source IP address which has appeared in this period. We define L m as the legal count belonged to source IP address m, while S m is the suspicious count if dIP r not in the popularity table then 10: add an entry for IP m ;
11:
PV m (t − 1) = PV default ;
12:
C m (t) = 0; 13: end if 14: if reason_field == ''idle_timeout then 15: C m (t)+ = d r ÷ T ; 16: else if reason_field == ''hard_timeout then 17: C m (t)+ = h r ÷ T ; 18: end if 19 : end for 20: for each Packet_In mecssage of flow q arriving at the controller do 21: get dIP q as IP n ;
22:
if dIP n not in the popularity table then 23: add an entry for IP n ;
24:
PV n (t − 1) = PV default ;
25:
C n (t) = 1; if C i (t) N th (t) then 35: PV i (t) = PV i (t − 1) + 1; 36: else if 0 < C i (t) < N th (t) then 37: PV i (t) = PV i (t − 1); 38: else 39: [24] as shown in equation (2) . Bayesian systems take binary ratings as input, and are based on computing reputation scores by statistical updating of beta probability density functions (PDF), which provide a theoretically 59260 VOLUME 6, 2018 sound basis for computing trust value.
Suspicious counter belong to an attacker is usually very large while the legal counter is small. For example, if S m of a IP address m is 80 while L m is 5, TV m can be calculated as (5 + 1)/(5 + 80 + 2), which is equal to 0.069. The trust value of IP address m is very small so that we will definitely judge it as an attacker.
Note that we only calculate the trust value when the cumulative number of both the legal and the suspicious count belonging to IP address m exceeds N θ in order to reduce the false alarm rate. We have analyzed the cumulative number of the flows sent by the benign hosts according to the traffic trace in [17] . Actually, most of the benign hosts only contribute a small fraction of flows, which has little impact on the performance of controller. However, if a benign host has accessed multiple destination addresses which are short in duration but the length of some other few connections belong to this host is long in duration, the calculated Trust Value will be a small value. Trust Value will be inaccurate if the cumulative number threshold value is small. In a practical SDN network, the value of threshold N θ should be set according to the processing and bandwidth capability of the controller. In this paper, as we set the service rate of controller as 400 requests per time slot, the threshold value N θ is set as 20. However, considering the variety of network status and the different processing ability of controllers, N θ can be adjusted to a larger value in order to get a better performance in distinguishing the malicious host and reducing the false alarm rate.
At last, those IP addresses whose trust value is below than the pre-defined threshold TV th will be treated as the malicious hosts and be added to the blacklist table as blocking rules. The selection of the other thresholds in algorithm 2 is in relation to the experimental settings, which will be evaluated in Section V.
5) QUEUE MANAGEMENT MODULE
A queue management module is developed in the SDN controller to manage the buffer queues. The module maintains two buffer queues with different priority and it can adjust the size of each buffer queue. The module keeps interacting with the switches so that it can prioritize the Packet_In messages into different priority queues. Only when the high priority queue is empty, the Packet_In messages in low priority queue will be served. Both the two buffer queues employ FIFO (first in first out) method so that tail requests will be dropped when either of the buffer queues is full. Then, the low priority queue implements rate limiting mechanism to avoid the crash of the controller.
V. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION

A. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENT SETTING
We build a prototype system to implement the proposed approach in the SDN environment. We develop the popularity if d r ≤ T θ and v r ≤ P θ then 21: mark flow r as a suspicious flow; else if d r > T θ and v r > P θ then 24: mark flow r as a legal flow; 25: L j (t)+ = 1; 
L m (t)+S m (t)+2 ; 33: if TV m (t) < TV th then 34: mark IP m as a malicious IP address; 35: install blocking rules for IP m into the blacklist table; 36: end if 37: end if 38: end for and timeout analysis based controller protection application on Ryu [25] controller, a python based OpenFlow controller platform. The switch is modified based on OpenvSwitch [29] .
We build an experiment topology in Mininet [26] environment, which consists of one Ryu controller and two switches as shown in Figure 1 . The Ryu performance test result [31] provided by Global SDN Certified Testing Center shows that Ryu controller can handle at most 5000 Packet_In requests. Considering the limitation of Mininet, the controller in our experiments is modified to be able to process 400 requests per time slot, while the buffer size of the controller is set as 400. In addition, there are totally 160 users in the network, VOLUME 6, 2018 including 100 servers, 10 attackers and 50 benign hosts. All the traffic in the experiment is generated by using Scapy [27] . The duration of per time slot in popularity calculating experiment d r is set as 60 seconds. In the other experiments, the duration of per time slot is set as 1 second.
As SDN decouples the control plane from the data plane, the arriving rate of a host will be divided into two parts. One is from the host to the switch and another is from the switch to the controller. The request rate from a switch to controller is determined by the idle timeout and the hard timeout of each flow entry in the switch. By default, the benign requests sending rate from the switch to the controller obeys a Poisson distribution. According to [17] , the request sending rate from the switch to the controller in a real campus boundary routers ranges from 50 to 130 per time slot during the daytime. So that in our experiment, the benign requests are all Poisson arrivals with the value as about 100 per time slot on average. The service time between a benign host and a server in our experiment obeys negative exponential distribution.
It is really difficult to find the attack trace in real SDN environment. In the simulation, the ratio of the traffic to the benign traffic is set according to CAIDA DDoS 2007 dataset [32] . We reshape the scale of the traffic to make it more applicable to the scenario of SDN controller oriented flooding attack. The arriving rate of the malicious requests from the switch to the controller is set as 10 times faster than that of the benign ones on average. The probability that a destination address is requested by the malicious host obeys uniform distribution, which means that each destination address will be requested by the attacks equiprobably.
B. THE IMPACT OF CONTROLLER-ORIENTED FLOODING ATTACK
Firstly, we simulate an SDN controller-oriented flooding attack without any protecting mechanism to demonstrate the impact of the attack. We compare the number of Packet_In requests between the benign hosts and the attackers served by the controller, which is shown in Figure 7 .
During the first 20 time slots, there are only benign requests to the controller. The controller is able to serve all the requests. From the 20th time slot, the malicious requests are injected, which is 10 times faster than that of benign requests. The controller is overwhelmed immediately. Most of the benign requests are dropped by the controller. The reason is that the controller can only serve 400 requests per time slot. The arriving rate of benign requests is about 100 per time slot on average while the malicious one is about 1000 per time slot. The number of total requests has exceeded the maximum processing capability of the controller. The controller has to drop both the benign and the malicious requests. As a result, only a few benign requests can be served by the controller.
The purpose of the flooding attack is to overwhelm the controller rather than a single host. Once the controller is overwhelmed, the entire network controlled by this controller will be affected. To implement an effective attack, the malicious hosts need to send packets with different destinations to generate amounts of Packet_In messages. Although the total traffic volume in the data plane does not vary dramatically, the number of control plane messages arriving at the controller increases significantly.
C. POPULARITY CALCULATING AND POPULAR ADDRESS MATCHING TABLE RULES INSTALLING
In this experiment, we firstly rank the servers with different popularity level from 1 to 100. According to Zipf's Law, the server's popularity of rank k, f (k; ρ, N ), is shown in equation (3):
Therefore, the probability that a destination address is requested by the benign host obeys Zipf's distribution. We modify the parameter ρ to make sure about 80% benign requests go to the 20% most popular addresses.
We have set the IP addresses of servers from 192.168.3.2 to 192.168.3.101. The order of the servers' popularity is in relation to their IP addresses. For example, the server of which IP address is 192.168.3.2 has the highest popularity. The popularity level decreases as the IP address increases. As a result, the pre-defined popularity level of IP address 192.168.3.2 is set as the highest, the pre-defined popularity level of IP address 192.168.3.3 is set as the second highest, etc. We would like to validate whether the calculated popularity values of servers match the pre-defined popularity level in this experiment.
Additionally, we set the forgetting factor α as 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 respectively. The duration T of each time slot lasts for 60 seconds in popularity calculating experiment. At the end of every time slot, popularity values of the most popular addresses are calculated as an output. In this part, we record the popularity value for each server and plot the variation curve of several of them as shown in Figure 8 . From the figures, we have noticed that the popularity of servers meets our expectation. The real calculated popularity of servers is in line with the pre-defined one in general. We have noticed that, the popularity value of the server with IP address 192.168.3.15 is close to zero. The reason can be explained according to Zipf's Law. Only a few requests are directed to these servers which are not popular in each time slot. Additionally, we can find that the popularity level of servers does not changes as α changes. α will only have an impact on the decay rate when the network state has varied (The IP addresses of some popular servers change). If the network state does not vary significantly, the influence of α will be very little.
Once the attack happens, the state of controller protection system will turn to Initial state. The proactive flow table rules will be installed in the Popular Address Matching Table as shown in Figure 9 .The flow table rules of the servers with higher popularity are set with higher priority. The requests to these destinations will be sent to the controller preferentially. The other packets will be buffered in the low priority queue and wait for being send to the controller with rate limiting.
D. TRUST VALUE CALCULATING AND THRESHOLDS SELECTING
As mentioned in Malicious Host Discrimination Algorithm, if the duration of a removed flow is lower than the timeout threshold, it will be marked as a suspicious flow. Otherwise, it will be treat as a legal flow. We can further calculate the trust value of each source IP address according to Algorithm 2.
To implement a successful Packet_In flooding attack, such as [28] demonstrates, each attacker should barely send packets to a same destination. Therefore, we set the packet count threshold P θ of each flow as 3. Then we keep calculating trust value of each hosts according to formula 2. When the attack happens, the trust value of the malicious host decreases dramatically. During the 25th time slot as shown in Figure 7 , the suspicious counter of attacker 1 is 96, while the legal counter of attacker 1 is 5. The trust value of attacker 1 can be calculated as: We further compare the statistic of trust value between the benign hosts and the attackers under different timeout setting. We set the idle timeout of a flow i r as 5s, 10s, 15s and 20s respectively while the corresponding timeout threshold T θ is set as 6s, 11s, 16s and 21s. As shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 , there is almost no difference about the trust values among the attackers or among the benign hosts when the idle timeout is set as different values. Reference [30] proves that when the flooding attack happens, the flow table of the SDN switch confronts tremendous challenge. The longer the idle timeout i r is, the more packets will be dropped by the switch. Because the table size of a switch is limited. If the idle timeout i r is too long, many previously installed flow table rules will remain in the switch's flow table. New rules cannot be installed in the switch. To alleviate the pressure of flow table as well as quickly distinguish the attackers from the benign hosts, we finally set the idle timeout of a flow i r as 5 seconds while the timeout threshold T θ is set VOLUME 6, 2018 as 6 seconds when the controller is under attack. The cumulative number threshold N θ is set as 20 considering the scale of the experiment network. When the sum of both legal counter and suspicious counter exceeds 20, the trust value will be calculated.
Additionally, Figure 12 presents the statistic result of trust values of the benign hosts and the attackers. From the figures we can find that, there are hardly any attackers whose trust value exceeds 0.2 while there are a few benign hosts whose trust value are below 0.2. Therefore, we finally set the threshold of trust value TV th as 0.2. To evaluate the detection effect of PoTiA, we introduce detection rate (DR) and false alarm rate (FR). In this paper, the detection rate represents the probability that the controller claims to detect an attacker and it is really an attacker. The false alarm rate represents the probability that the controller claims to detect an attacker whereas it is a benign host. We repeat the attack for 150 times and keep calculating the trust values of both the benign hosts and the attackers. The attack traffic in this experiment uses different parts of the DDoS attack traces. The source addresses from the attackers are different every time. The destination addresses requested by the attackers obeys uniform distribution. DR and FR can be calculated from Figure 12 . The detection rate is 99.90% while the false alarm rate is 0.41%.
As a result, any host whose trust value is lower than 0.2 will be treated as an attacker and the blocking entries of this attacker will be added to the blacklist table as shown in Figure 13 .
E. THE DEFENSE EFFECT OF THE CONTROLLER PROTECTION SYSTEM
After knowing the severe impact of the controller-oriented flooding attack, we simulate another experiment to evaluate the defense effect of our popularity and timeout analysis based controller protection approach.
We simulate a Packet_In flooding attack with the malicious requests to the mixed destination addresses. Half of the requested addresses really exists in the control domain of the controller while the other half does not exist.
As shown in Figure 14 , the attackers initiate to send Packet_In requests since the 20th time slot. The flooding attack lasts for a total of 30 time slots. At the beginning of the attack, the controller detects that the arriving rate of Packet_In requests has exceeded the threshold. The controller protection system will turn into Initial state, meanwhile, the controller protection application will install proactive flow table rules for the popular addresses on the switch. Then the Attack Defense state is invoked and the Timeout Analysis module starts to work. The blocking rules for the attackers keep being added to the blacklist table. After about ten time slots, all the addresses of the attackers are added to the blacklist table. Although the attackers keep sending attack traffic, the switch blocked them all from the in_port. Thus, no more malicious Packet_In messages will be sent to the controller after the 32th time slot, as shown in Figure 15 . As a result, the number of Packet_In requests to the controller falls to the normal degree.
The length of the time for discriminating and blocking all the attackers is dynamic, which depends on the attack mode and the value of idle_timeout. In our design, the Malicious Host Discrimination algorithm works by analyzing the duration of the flows according to the idle_timeout in the Flow_Removed messages. From the experimental results in Figure 10 and 11, we have found that there is almost no difference about the trust values among the attackers or among the benign hosts when the value of idle_timeout is set as different values. To alleviate the pressure of flow table as well as distinguish the attackers from the benign hosts quickly, we finally set the value of idle_timeout as 5 seconds, a relatively small one. In the experimental setting, we have assumed that all the attackers start to send packets simultaneously. Thus, the first Flow_Removed message from the attacks will arrive at the controller after 5 seconds. In addition, considering the rate limiting mechanism of the low buffer queue, most of the attack traffic has been dropped during the attack. Thus, it will take another few seconds for the controller to discriminate all the attackers and block them. The total time is about 5 seconds plus another few seconds. As shown in Figure 14 , it takes no more than 10 seconds to block all the attackers from the beginning of the attack. The time is not fixed, but the effect is outstanding. However, if new attackers keep emerging continuously, the blocking time will increase. Additionally, the blocking time will be longer if the value of idle_timeout is set as a larger value.
F. COMPARISON WITH RATE LIMITING (RL) AND FLOWRANGER
In this part, we compare our PoTiA approach with Rate Limiting (RL) and FlowRanger [14] about the ratio of served benign requests under the scenario of the pulse flooding attack. Rate limiting is a promising approach to protect the controller from Packet_In flooding attack. OpenFlow 1.3 enabled switch has the capability to limit the sending rate of Packet_In messages. However, when the attack happens, the switch will limit the rate of both the benign requests and the malicious ones. As a result, the benign requests will be dropped by RL, too. FlowRanger is a buffer prioritizing solution to protect controller from attacking requests. It calculates trust values of the requesting sources, which can significantly enhance the request serving rate of the benign hosts under the flooding attacks against the controller. In our PoTiA approach, when the attack happens, some proactive flow table rules are installed in the switch to make sure the requests to the most popular destinations can be served with higher priority. The other requests with lower priority will be sent to the controller with rate limiting.
The maximum processing capability of controller is still set as 400 requests per time slot. Therefore, we set the maximum sending rate of the switch as 400 requests per time slot with RL approach. As there are two buffer queues with different priority in PoTiA approach, we set the maximum sending rate of low priority queue as 400 requests per time slot. Only when the buffer of high priority queue is empty, the low priority queue will start to send the requests.
As shown in Figure 16 , the attack starts from the 20th time slot. In RL approach, the controller has set the maximum sending rate of the switch in advance. Therefore, when the attack happens, the arriving rate to the controller will not exceed its maximum processing capability. However, the serve ratio of the benign requests drops to about 30% as well as that of the malicious requests; FlowRanger is a real-time controller protection approach. It keeps calculating trust value every time slot with careless about whether the controller is under attack or not. Therefore, the serving rate of the benign request cannot reach to 100% even when there is no attack in the network. In our PoTiA approach, the controller detects the arriving rate of Packet_In requests has exceeded the threshold in the 21th time slot. Then the controller turns the state into Initial state immediately. The proactive flow table rules are installed onto the switch and the timeout analysis module is invoked. Then the switch starts to send both the unpopular requests and the malicious ones to the controller with rate limiting. There is a short delay before all the blocking rules are installed in the blacklist table. After about 7 to 8 time slots, all the blocking rules are added to the blacklist table. Then, the ratio of the served benign requests to the total benign ones turns back to 100%.
Above all, our PoTiA approach has a better performance in distinguishing the attackers from the benign hosts. It only need a few several time slots to mitigate the attack traffic from the source of the switches. The controller can turn back into normal state quickly.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a popularity and timeout analysis based controller protection approach to protect the SDN controller from flooding attack. We comprehensively take the arriving rate of requests, popularity of hosts, priority of queues and the duration of flows into consideration to develop a controller protection application in the SDN controller. The application can periodically calculate the popularity of each host. Once the flooding attack is detected by the application, it can immediately change the state and enable three flow tables as well as dual buffer queues mode in the switch. Then the proactive flow table rules of the most popular destination addresses will be installed in the switch. The packets that match the rules can be served by the controller through the high priority queue. The other mismatched packets will be served by the controller through the low priority queue with rate limiting. Additionally, the timeout analysis module will start to work and keep calculating trust values of each host's address. The address of which the trust value is lower than the threshold will be added to the blacklist table as the blocking rules so that the following attack flows can be dropped from the source of the switches. We simulate sufficient experiments in Mininet to verify the functions and evaluate the performance of our approach. Our PoTiA approach can alleviate the controller from the flooding attack effectively. The detection rate is 99.90% while the false alarm rate is 0.41%.
Most of the threshold values in this paper are selected according to the experiments or the other references. However, considering the variety of network status and the different processing ability of controller and switch, some of the threshold values, such as N θ can be adjusted to get better performance in distinguishing the malicious host. It's a promising method to use deep learning techniques in selecting some of the threshold values. In the future work, we plan to train the parameters with deep learning model to get more accurate threshold values. 
